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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish 
that Mr. Powell possessed a dangerous weapon. When reviewing a 
sufficiency-of-evidence challenge from a criminal bench trial, 
the appellate court "must sustain the trial court's judgment 
unless it is 'against the clear weight of the evidence.'" State 
v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). Consequently, the 
appellate court "will review the record to see if the clear 
weight of the evidence, not including demeanor and credibility, 
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is contrary to the verdict." Id. at 787; see also State v. 
Gurr, 904 P.2d 238, 241, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Preservation of Issue or Statement of Grounds for Review 
Trial counsel preserved this issue by moving for a directed 
verdict after the State rested in case (See R. 93 (5/19/99 Tr. 
Trans.), pp. 34-36). Additionally, trial counsel argued in 
closing argument that the State had failed to establish 
possession of the firearm beyond a reasonable doubt (See id. at 
R. 93, pp. 71-73). 
2. Whether the sentencing judge plainly erred in the 
course of sentencing Mr. Powell by violating Article 1, § 7, of 
the Utah Constitution and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22 (a) . 
The legal principles of plain error are set forth in State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) and State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). See also 
State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, Hf27-36, 31 P.3d 615. 
Preservation of Issue or Statement of Grounds for Review 
The sentencing judge's errors are reviewable for plain 
error or exceptional circumstances. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 
922-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Cf. State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 
241, ff27-36. 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, 
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body 
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case, as it is presently constituted, involves 
essentially two questions. First, was there sufficient evidence 
at trial to convict Mr. Powell of possession of a firearm as a 
restricted person? Second, did the trial court commit plain 
error by violating Mr. Powell's right to due process and Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) in the course of sentencing? 
The State charged Mr. Powell with the Illegal Possession of 
a Handgun, a third degree felony (Count 1), Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (Count 2), Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a class B misdemeanor (Count 3), and 
Improper Lane Operation, a class B misdemeanor (Count 4). Mr. 
Powell pleaded not guilty to all charges. 
Mr. Powell appeared before the district court for a bench 
trial. After the State rested its case, Mr. Powell's trial 
counsel moved for a directed verdict on Counts 1 and 4 of the 
Amended Information. The trial court, upon the State's 
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stipulation, dismissed Count 4. However, the trial court denied 
the motion as to Count 1. 
After trial, the court immediately convicted Mr. Powell of 
Counts 1, 2, and 3. The trial court subsequently sentenced Mr. 
Powell in absentia to an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years in the Utah State Prison for Count 1 and two terms of six 
months on Counts 2 and 3, to run concurrently with each other 
and with the term imposed for Count 1. Although the Sentence, 
Judgment, and Commitment was signed by the court on October 19, 
2000, it is reflected as having been entered on October 17, 
2000. 
Mr. Powell filed a pro se Notice of Intent to Appeal and 
Request of Appointment of Counsel for Appeal on November 13, 
2000. In addition, Mr. Powell, through appointed appellate 
counsel, filed Notice of Appeal on November 15, 2000. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. During rush-hour traffic on December 17, 1998, Mr. 
Powell, in the course of attempting to change lanes, was 
involved in an automobile accident that involved numerous other 
vehicles (R. 26-28, Amended Information; R. 93 (3/19/99 Tr. 
Trans.), p. 24, lines 12-13). 
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2. At the time, Mr. Powell lived with Ms. Shannon Lee 
Stewart in Wyoming (R. 93 (3/19/99 Tr. Trans.), p. 39). 
3. Mr. Powell had traveled from their residence in 
Wyoming to Utah so that Mr. Powell could be with Ms. Stewart, 
who at the time was staying with family while she worked in 
Centerville, Utah {Id. at R. 93, pp. 38-39). 
4. Earlier that day, Mr. Powell and Ms. Stewart had been 
"running errands" in their car {Id. at R. 93, pp. 41, 51, 60, 
and 3 9). 
5. Approximately mid-morning, while running errands, Mr. 
Powell and Ms. Stewart had an argument, after which Ms. Stewart 
abruptly got out of the vehicle and Mr. Powell drove away in the 
car - mad {Id. at R. 93, pp. 51, 41-42, and 52). In so doing, 
Ms. Stewart inadvertently left her back pack in the vehicle {Id. 
at R. 93, pp. 40-41). 
6. That day Ms. Stewart's back pack contained a separate 
fanny pack, which, in turn, contained her gun {Id. at R. 93, p. 
40-41) . Ms. Stewart owned the gun prior to her relationship 
with Mr. Powell {Id. at R. 93, p. 46). 
7. Ms. Stewart had placed the back pack in the car 
earlier that day prior to running errands {Id. at R. 93, pp. 16, 
51) . 
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8. After driving off mad, Mr. Powell went to work (Id. at 
R. 93, p. 61). In the course of returning from work, Mr. Powell 
was involved in the previously mentioned accident {Id.). 
9. After the officers began investigating the accident, 
the odor of burnt Marijuana allegedly emanated from the vehicle 
driven by Mr. Powell {Id. at R. 93, p. 6). 
10. Officer Anderson, Utah Highway Patrol, subsequently 
searched the vehicle and found what he believed to be drug 
paraphernalia (Id. at R. 93, p. 8). He also allegedly found a 
pipe on the roadside some distance from the vehicle, which 
contained marijuana residue (Id. at R. 93, p. 11). 
11. In the process of the search, Officer Anderson 
searched a back pack that he found on the passenger seat (Id. at 
R. 93, p. 12). Inside the back pack, Officer Douglas found a 
zippered fanny pack, which contained a nine-millimeter handgun 
and clips (Id.). 
12. The back pack, fanny pack, and the handgun were owned 
by Ms. Stewart, who lived with Mr. Powell at the time in Wyoming 
(Id. at R. 93, pp. 38-43). 
13. Mr. Powell was subsequently charged with the Illegal 
Possession of a Handgun, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3) (a) (Count 1), Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
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Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (Count 2), Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Count 3), and Improper Lane Operation, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-61(2) 
(Count 4) (See R. 2 6-28, Amended Information). 
14. Mr. Powell pleaded not guilty to all charges (R. 91 
(2/16/99 Arr. Trans.), p. 2). 
15. After the State rested its case, Mr. Powell's trial 
counsel moved for a directed verdict on Counts 1 and 4 of the 
Amended Information, arguing that the State presented no 
evidence to support either the alleged improper lane change or 
that Mr. Powell possessed Ms. Stewart's firearm (R. 93 (5/19/99 
Tr. Trans.), pp. 34-36). The trial court, upon the State's 
stipulation, dismissed Count 4 - the improper lane change charge 
(Id. at R. 93, p. 34). However, the trial court denied the 
motion as to Count 1 - the illegal possession of a handgun 
charge (Id. at R. 93, p. 37. 
16. After trial, the court immediately convicted Mr. 
Powell of Counts 1, 2, and 3 (R. 93 (3/19/99 Tr. Trans.)), p. 
77) . 
17. The trial court subsequently sentenced Mr. Powell in 
absentia to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison for Count 1 and two terms of six months on 
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Counts 2 and 3, to run concurrently with each other and with the 
term imposed for Count 1 (R. 61-62, Sentence, Judgment, and 
Commitment). Although the Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment 
was signed by the court on October 19, 2000, it is reflected as 
having been entered on October 17, 2000 {Id.) . 
18. On November 13, 2000, Mr. Powell filed a pro se Notice 
of Intent to Appeal and Request of Appointment of Counsel for 
Appeal (R. 66-67). 
19. Additionally, Mr. Powell, through appointed appellate 
counsel, filed Notice of Appeal on November 15, 2000 (R. 71-74, 
Notice of Appeal). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. To establish possession, the State must present 
evidence at trial to show that the defendant exercised dominion 
and control over the weapon, with knowledge of its presence. 
The evidence presented by the State at trial, as demonstrated by 
the previously marshaled evidence, shows that Mr. Powell did not 
u
'exercise[ ] dominion or control" over the firearm "with 
knowledge of its presence.7" State v. Banks, 72 0 P.2d 1380, 
1384 (Utah 1986) (quoting State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 135, 
139, 514 P.2d 800, 803 (Utah 1973)). The marshaled evidence 
demonstrates that the State failed to present evidence that Mr. 
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Powell knew the firearm was in the car, let alone in the back 
pack owned by Ms. Stewart. Moreover, the State presented no 
evidence that Mr. Powell exercised any control over the firearm. 
2. Rule 22(a) unequivocally directs the sentencing court 
to "afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and 
to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to 
show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed" before 
imposing sentence. Moreover, the due process clause of Article 
1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that a 
sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant 
information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence. 
Before imposing sentence, the court heard from neither 
defense counsel nor the prosecutor concerning any information in 
mitigation of punishment or any other information material to 
the imposition of sentence. Further, the court made little, if 
any, reference at the sentencing hearing to the Presentence 
Investigation Report, which had been previously prepared for the 
very purpose of sentencing. 
By not affording either defense counsel or the prosecutor 
the opportunity of presenting information material to the 
imposition of sentence, the trial court committed plain error. 
Based on the plain and clear language of Article 1, § 7, of the 
Utah Constitution, and Utah case law, the errors committed by 
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the sentencing judge was obvious. Finally, the sentencing 
judge's errors were prejudicial to Mr. Powell inasmuch as both 
he, through counsel, and the prosecutor were precluded from 
presenting information prior to sentencing, which is a critical 
stage of the criminal proceedings. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
AT TRIAL TO ESTABLISH THAT MR. POWELL POSSESSED A 
DANGEROUS WEAPON. 
A. Sufficiency-of-Evidence Challenge. 
When confronted with a sufficiency-of-evidence challenge 
from a criminal bench trial, the appellate court "must sustain 
the trial court's judgment unless it is 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence.'" State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786 
(Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987)). Consequently, the appellate court "will review the 
record to see if the clear weight of the evidence, not including 
demeanor and credibility, is contrary to the verdict." Id. at 
787; see also State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 238, 241, 242 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). 
A conviction will be upheld only if it is "xsupported by a 
quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as 
charged from which the [factfinder] may base its conclusion of 
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guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 
1999 UT App 61, f5, 975 P.2d 501 (alternation in original) 
(quoting State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980)). 
Further, a guilty verdict is invalid if based exclusively "xon 
inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative 
possibilities of guilt.'" Id. (quoting State v. Workman, 852 
P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993)). 
B. Marshaling Requirement. 
The appellate court will not address a challenge of a 
finding of fact unless the appellant properly marshals the 
evidence. See State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, fl3, 983 P.2d 
556. To properly marshal the evidence, the appellant must 
"marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's decision and 
demonstrate that such evidence is insufficient to support the 
court's findings of fact . . . ." Id. 
In Utah, a person previously convicted of a crime of 
violence or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug is 
prohibited from possessing a dangerous weapon. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-503 (1) (a) . To establish possession, the State must 
present evidence at trial to show that the defendant M* exercised 
dominion and control' over the weapon, "with knowledge of its 
presence.'" State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1986) 
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(quoting State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 135, 139, 514 P.2d 800, 
803 (1973)). 
C. Marshaling of Evidence that Supports the Trial 
Court's Finding. 
In the instant case, the trial court made the following 
findings concerning the charge of illegal possession of a 
handgun: 
The Court would find that the back pack 
was on the passenger seat sitting upright, 
immediately adjacent to [Defendant] and the 
Court finds that it is not logical that it 
would land in that position as a result of 
the collision. 
Therefore, the Court finds that it was 
accessible to him and under his control. 
The Court finds the fact that he argued with 
the officer about whether or not a chamber 
had been, a bullet had been chambered, 
indicates direct knowledge of the defendant 
about the weapon, and therefore the Court 
would find that he was in possession of the 
weapon at the time alleged, that he was a 
user of controlled substance, not only as a 
result of the finding of the marijuana and 
the paraphernalia in the vehicle and in 
close proximity to him, but from his own, 
but from his own acknowledgment. 
Therefore, the Court finds the 
defendant guilty of the illegal possession 
of a handgun, possession of drug 
paraphernalia and possession of marijuana. 
See R. 93 (5/19/99 Tr. Trans.), pp. 76-77. 
The following list constitutes the evidence supporting the 
trial court's finding or determination that Mr. Powell illegally 
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possessed the firearm found in a fanny pack that, in turn, was 
found in a separate back pack located in the vehicle: 
1) Mr. Powell apparently did not want Officer Anderson in 
the car when moving the vehicle out of traffic. See 
id. at R. 93, p. 5; 
2) After the collision, the back pack in which the 
firearm was found was located on the front passenger 
seat adjacent to Mr. Powell. See id. at R. 93, p. 10; 
3) After finding the firearm in the back pack, Officer 
Anderson argued with Mr. Powell about whether or not a 
bullet had been chambered in the firearm. See id. at 
R. 93, p. 15; 
4) Mr. Powell knew that there was a loaded magazine in 
the firearm. See id.; 
5) Mr. Powell stated that Ms. Stewart "had put the gun in 
the car." See id. at R. 93, p. 16; 
6) Mr. Powell knew that Ms. Stewart owned and carried a 
gun and that she would not keep a gun loaded with a 
bullet chambered. See id. at R. 93, pp. 44-45; 
7) Even though the vehicle in which the firearm was found 
was shared by Mr. Powell and Ms. Stewart, it had been 
registered in Mr. Powell's name. See id. at R. 93, 
pp. 4 8; and 
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8) Mr. Powell knew that Ms. Stewart "often" carried the 
firearm in her back pack. See id. at R. 93, p. 65. 
D. The Marshaled Evidence is Insufficient to Support 
the Trial Court's Finding that Mr. Powell 
Knowingly Possessed the Firearm. 
The evidence presented by the State at trial, as 
demonstrated by the previously marshaled evidence, shows that 
Mr. Powell did not "'exercise[ ] dominion or control" over the 
firearm "with knowledge of its presence.'" State v. Banks, 720 
P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1986) (quoting State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 
2d 135, 139, 514 P.2d 800, 803 (Utah 1973)). There was no 
evidence presented that Mr. Powell knew the firearm was in the 
car, let alone in the back pack owned by Ms. Stewart. Moreover, 
the State presented no evidence that Mr. Powell exercised any 
control over the firearm. 
Mr. Powell's knowledge about whether or not a bullet had 
been chambered in the firearm does not equate to proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he exercised dominion or control with 
knowledge of its presence in the vehicle. Direct knowledge by 
Mr. Powell of Ms. Stewart's practices concerning the gun simply 
do not constitute knowledge that the firearm was present in Ms. 
Stewart's back pack that she abruptly left in the vehicle 
earlier that day. 
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The State presented no evidence that Mr. Powell, rather 
than Ms. Stewart, who undisputably owned not only the gun, but 
the back pack, and the fanny pack in which the gun was kept, 
possessed or controlled the firearm. Further, it is wholly 
irrational to conclude that the mere presence of the gun in the 
vehicle meant that Mr. Powell, rather that Ms. Stewart, who 
admittedly had equal access to the car and who admittedly left 
the back pack in the car earlier that day after an argument with 
Mr. Powell, possessed or controlled it. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED MR. POWELL'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND UTAH RULE 
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22(a) IN THE COURSE OF 
SENTENCING MR. POWELL. 
The second paragraph of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
22(a) states: 
Before imposing sentence the court 
shall afford the defendant an opportunity to 
make a statement and to present any 
information in mitigation of punishment, or 
to show any legal cause why sentence should 
not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney 
shall also be given an opportunity to 
present any information material to the 
imposition of sentence. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). Because Mr. Powell was involuntarily 
absent and unable to personally attend his sentencing, he did 
not waive the right to make a statement at sentencing or present 
information in mitigation of punishment or to show legal cause 
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why sentence should not be imposed. Cf. State v. Anderson, 929 
P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah 1996); see also State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 
1005, 1007 (Utah 1982) (holding that "[s]entencing is a critical 
stage of a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is entitled 
to the effective assistance of counsel"). 
Rule 22 (a) unequivocally directs the sentencing court to 
"afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to 
present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show 
any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed" before 
imposing sentence. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). Moreover, 
u[t]he due process clause of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution, requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably 
reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in 
fixing a sentence." State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 
1985); see also State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 
1980) (discussing consideration of defendant's background and 
crime committed for sentence to be appropriate and to serve the 
interests of society); State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1249 
(Utah 1980) (requiring disclosure of presentence report to 
defendant prior to sentencing). 
At sentencing in this case, the sentencing judge recognized 
that Mr. Powell was involuntarily absent. See R. 94 (10/17/00 
Sentencing Transcript), p. 1; see also R. 59-60, Consent to 
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Sentencing in Absentia. After briefly discussing Mr. Powell's 
involuntary absence and the consent to sentencing in absentia, 
the sentencing judge then proceeded to impose sentence. See R. 
94 (10/17/00 Sentencing Transcript), pp. 1-3. Before imposing 
sentence, the court heard from neither defense counsel nor the 
prosecutor concerning "any information in mitigation of 
punishment" or "any [other] information material to the 
imposition of sentence." See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). Further, 
the trial court made little, if any, reference during the 
sentencing hearing to the Presentence Investigation Report, 
which had been previously prepared for the very purpose of 
sentencing. See R. 73-94, Presentence Investigation Report.1 
By not providing the prosecutor the opportunity to present 
information material to sentencing, the sentencing judge 
precluded Mr. Powell and prosecutor from making any 
recommendation or arguments concerning Mr. Powell's sentence. 
By not affording either defense counsel or the prosecutor 
the opportunity of presenting information material to the 
imposition of sentence, the trial court committed plain error. 
*The Presentence Investigation Report is part of the record 
of the related case involving Mr. Powell that is currently before 
this Court in State v. Powell, Case No. 20001054-CA. The trial 
court sentenced Mr. Powell in absentia on both cases at the same 
sentencing hearing on October 17, 2000. See R. 94 (10/17/00 
Sentencing Transcript). 
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To prevail on a claim of plain error, a defendant must show u(i) 
An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined. State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
Based on the plain and clear language of Rule 22(a), 
Article 1, § 7, of the Utah Constitution, and Utah case law, the 
errors committed by the sentencing judge were obvious. Cf. 
State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ^27-36, 31 P.3d 615. 
Finally, the sentencing judge's errors were prejudicial to Mr. 
Powell inasmuch as both he, through counsel, and the prosecutor 
were precluded from presenting information prior to sentencing, 
which is a critical stage of the criminal proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Powell respectfully requests 
that this Court vacate both the conviction of Illegal Possession 
of a Handgun and the invalid Sentencing, which violated due 
process and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22 (a), and that the 
Court remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
the instructions in its Opinion, and for such other relief as 
21 
the Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances of 
this case, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 0th day of February, 2 0 02 
WIGGINS, P.C. 
Scott 
Attorney Appellant 
22 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the 
following on the 20th day of February, 2002: 
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
P.O. Box 140854 
160 East 3 00 South^-fi^h Floor 
Salt Lake City^-I^V 84^4-0854 
23 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A: Amended Information 
Addendum B: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 
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Tab A 
MELVINC WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
P 0 Box 618 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone (801)451-4300 
Fax (801)451-4328 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
DANIEL B POWELL, 
DOB 11/25/1966, 
Defendant 
Bail 
AMENDED INFORMATION 
Case No 991700002 
OTN 
The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant, on 
or about December 17, 1998, at County of Davis, State of Utah, committed the crimes of 
COUNT 1 
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF A HANDGUN (76-10-503(3)(a) UCA), a felony of the 
thud degree, as follows That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant who is an unlawful user 
of controlled substances as defined in Section 58-37-2 UCA, was in possession of a handgun 
COUNT 2 
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, (58-37a-5(l)), a class B 
misdemeanor, as follows That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did knowingly, 
intentionally or recklessly use, or possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, 
cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
By 
?>l£0l 
to 8 / / 
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pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body. 
COUNT 3 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (58-37-8(2)(a)(i) UCA), a class B 
misdemeanor, as follows" That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did knowingly and 
intentionally possess or use a controlled substance, to wit: marijuana. 
COUNT 4 
IMPROPER LANE OPERATION, (41-6-61(2)), a class B misdemeanor, as follows: 
That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did operate and travel in the center-lane of a three 
lane roadway in direct violation of official traffic-control devices, to wit: either failing to pass another 
vehicle safely in said center-lane or, attempting to make or execute an improper left turn in said 
center-lane. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness: Douglas 
Anderson. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT' The undersigned prosecutor is a Deputy Davis 
County Attorney and has received information from the investigating officer, Douglas Anderson of 
the Utah Highway Patrol, and the Information herein is based upon such personal observations and 
investigation of said officer. 
On December 17, 1998, defendant was involved in an accident where he made an 
improper lane change. During the investigation, officers noticed an odor of marijuana coming from 
defendant He admitted using marijuana in the past two days. During a search of defendant's 
belongings, a handgun was located. A pipe with marijuana residue and rolling papers were also 
found. 
y \ 
Authorized March 3, 1999, 
for presentment and filing: 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
Presented and filed this 3 day of May <A 19-2-f 
Clerk 
A felony of the third degree carries a possible maximum penalty of up to five years imprisonment 
and/or up to $5,000 fine. 
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2nd District - Farmington Dept COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL B POWELL, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 991700002 FS 
Judge: RODNEY S. PAGE 
Date: October 17, 2000 
PRESENT 
Clerk: glendap 
Prosecutor: WEST, JUDITH 
Defendant not present 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CELLA, GLEN T 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 25, 1966 
Video 
Tape Number: 10/17/00 Tape Count: 2.30 
CHARGES 
1. PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/19/1999 Guilty 
2. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/19/1999 Guilty 
3. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/19/1999 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON 
a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the DAVIS County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Page 1 
Case No: 991700002 
Date: Oct 17, 2000 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The prison sentence is to run concurrent with the jail sentences. 
This is run concurrent with the federal sentence and to be served 
in the federal prison. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to 
a term of 6 month(s) 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 6 month(s) 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The jail sentences are to run concurrent with each other and with 
the prison sentence. These are to run concurrent with the federal 
sentence and to be served in the federal prison. 
Consent to Sentencing in Absentia is filed. Defendant is serving 
sentence in a federal prison in Pennsylvania. 
Dated this ft^day of Q d h , 20^£>_. 
RODNEY Sf. PAGE ~ 
District Court Judge 
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